一类混合路由博弈的调和率研究

余孝军

doi:10.3879/j.issn.1000-0887.2013.04.010

一类混合路由博弈的调和率研究

doi: 10.3879/j.issn.1000-0887.2013.04.010

余孝军

贵州财经大学数学与统计学院;贵州省经济系统仿真重点实验室, 贵阳 550004

基金项目: 国家自然科学基金资助项目(71161005)；贵州省优秀科技教育人才省长专项资金资助项目(2011067)

详细信息

作者简介:
余孝军(1974—),男,湖南人,教授,博士(E-mail:xjyu-myu@163.com).

中图分类号: O225
计量
- 文章访问数: 1523
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- 被引次数: 0
出版历程
- 收稿日期: 2012-08-08
- 修回日期: 2013-04-03
- 刊出日期: 2013-04-15

On Coordination Ratio of a Mixed Routing Game

YU Xiao-jun

School of Mathematics and Statistics, Guizhou University of Finance and Economics; Guizhou Key Laboratory of Economic System Simulation, Guiyang 550004, P.R.China

摘要

摘要: 运用算法博弈论探讨了固定需求下由刻板用户和利他用户组成的混合路由博弈的调和率问题．首先，建立了刻画这类混合路由博弈的变分不等式模型；然后，运用解析推导的方法得到了该类路由博弈调和率的上界,并以现有文献中的结论为特例．
- 刻板用户 /
- 利他用户 /
- 路由博弈 /
- 变分不等式 /
- 调和率
Abstract: The upper bound of the coordination ratio for a mixed routing game associated with oblivious users and altruistic users with fixed demand was investigated by algorithmic game theory. Firstly, the variational inequality model was established to describe this mixed routing game. Then, the upper bound of coordination ratio was derived by analytic derivation. The results took the results in existence literatures as its special case.
- oblivious users /
- altruistic users /
- routing game /
- variational inequality /
- coordination ratio

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参考文献(18)

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